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IS THERE EVIDENCE FOR A CAPACITY CONSTRAINT IN 
HEDGE FUND STRATEGIES? 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
This paper examines whether hedge fund strategies are constrained by a capacity effect. 
Given that hedge funds pursue specialised investment strategies, which may not be readily 
scalable, there is a widely held view in the asset management industry that increases in assets 
invested in certain hedge fund strategies can be expected to lead to a crowding effect as more 
money chases the limited investment opportunities available. We make use of three 
performance measures to investigate the relationship between investment into hedge funds 
and excess returns. Using performance data, assets under management, and fund flows from 
1991 to 2004, we examine whether returns for nine strategic categories and three groups of 
strategies were affected by asset flows and assets under management. The results indicate that 
strategies which may be subject to execution constraints are Equity Market Neutral, Equity 
Long-Short, and Merger Arbitrage. There is no evidence for constraints at the industry level 
or for the other strategy groups analysed. We conclude that, given existing data on hedge fund 
definitions, inflows, and performance measures, there is only limited support for the capacity 
constraint hypothesis. 
 
 
Is there evidence for a capacity constraint in hedge fund strategies? 
 
 3 
IS THERE EVIDENCE FOR A CAPACITY CONSTRAINT IN 
HEDGE FUND STRATEGIES? 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Over the last fifteen years there has been a large increase in the assets under 
management committed to hedge fund strategies as well as the number of hedge funds 
engaged in a particular strategy. The rapid growth and increasing market impact of 
hedge funds has attracted academic interest, not least the proposition put forward by 
the hedge fund industry that they are able to engage in investment strategies that 
provide consistent above-average absolute returns without undue risk. This paper has 
a simple aim to examine whether the expansion of the industry has been subject to a 
capacity effect. That is, it addresses the question whether for the specific investment 
strategies pursued by hedge funds there is a crowding effect (Sillam, 2005). The 
proposition is that, as the industry has expanded, returns are reduced as the number 
and funds committed to particular strategies exhaust the limited investment 
opportunities that exist for particular strategies. 
 
It is important to understand the way funds operate and why there may well be a 
capacity effect. Martin Leibowitz (2005) makes the analogy that hedge funds are like 
alpha hunters while traditional asset management firms are beta grazers.1 The key 
element in this typography is that hedge funds are seen as highly pro-active investors 
constantly on the lookout for new investment opportunities. The assumption is that 
opportunities to earn enhanced return without commensurate risk are transient and 
hard to pin down. The analogy also suggests that when hedge funds are seen as game 
seekers, the existence of too many hunters in a particular location leads to rapid 
exhaustion of investment opportunities as well as crowding of the territory. 
 
Agarwal & Naik (1999) define two main groups of hedge fund strategies: directional 
and non-directional. However, Brooks & Kat (2001) and several others, especially 
                                                 
1
 William Goetzmann uses a similar analogy, where hedge funds are explorers and traditional asset 
managers are farmers. (personal communication with William Goetzmann). 
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people reporting for the financial press, divide hedge fund strategies into three broad 
groups: directional or market trend strategies, arbitrage or market neutral strategies, 
and event-driven strategies. Directional strategies, the group of strategies covering 
most hedge funds, aim to profit from changes in macroeconomic factors. Arbitrage 
strategies exploit market inefficiencies. Event-driven strategies are informational-
driven by particular corporate events, and can be seen as a specialised sub-group 
consisting of both directional and arbitrage strategies. However, given the way hedge 
funds operate, the specific strategies within each group can be difficult to define 
categorically, as hedge fund data vendors and fund managers have their own special 
ways of determining strategies. However there is some general agreement as to the 
major strategies and these are shown in Table 1.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
Early studies of hedge fund performance were hindered by poor availability of data 
and its quality. More recent studies have been able to make use of better databases 
and categorisations. Ackermann et al. (1999), Liang (1999), Agarwal & Naik (2000) 
and Amenc et al. (2003) find evidence that hedge funds do produce risk-adjusted 
excess returns, which indicates superior investment skill.  
 
Clunie & Ashton (2005) in a study similar to this paper calculate returns attributable 
to manager skill for different hedge funds strategies, using four different performance 
models: simple excess returns, the Sharpe Ratio, Jensen’s alpha, and a multifactor 
alpha model.2 They then compare the results and look at the correlation between the 
calculated returns and asset flows. They find that the performance of distressed 
securities and global macro strategies are significantly affected by asset flows. They 
also find that the ranking of strategies by alpha, as defined by the returns attributable 
                                                 
2
 Clunie & Ashton (2005) run regressions for their performance measures against annual net and gross 
asset flows over a ten-year period and hence only have ten data-points in their regressions. However, 
because of the scarcity of hedge fund data, it is difficult to get around this problem.  
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to manager skill, is the same regardless of the method of calculation, with the short 
selling strategy the only exception. This finding is in accord with those of Edwards & 
Caglayan (2001), Amenc et al. (2003), and Alexander & Dimitriu (2005). This means 
that even though performance models produce different excess risk-adjusted return 
estimates, the different models agree on which strategies are the best performers. A 
useful survey is provided by Géhin (2004), 
 
Loeys & Fransolet (2004) address a similar question to Clunie & Ashton (2005) since 
they are asking if the growth in the hedge fund industry is making it harder for hedge 
fund managers to find arbitrage opportunities. When looking at well-known arbitrage 
opportunities, they find that the returns on these have eroded most where hedge funds 
are major market participants. This suggests that hedge funds do make an impact on 
arbitrage opportunities, are increasing the level of market efficiency, and as a result 
are eroding the opportunities to earn excess returns. This fits with the Leibowitz 
(2005) thesis that as more hedge funds exploit market opportunities market efficiency 
will increase.3 Mitchell & Pulvino (2001) look specifically at merger arbitrage and 
point out the severe limitations under which most such funds operate, including 
severe market impact, illiquidity, transaction costs, and limitations in the amount of 
capital available to undertake particular transactions. Loeys & Fransolet conclude that 
the recent low returns in the hedge fund industry could be a result of fewer 
opportunities. However, they accept that this still cannot be proved and that more time 
and research is needed to be able to conclude whether the hedge fund industry has 
grown to any kind of maximum size, or still retains the capacity to deliver excess 
returns.  
 
Getmansky (2005) looks at the life cycle of hedge funds. By defining a so-called 
Favourable Positioning Metric system, she is able to measure a fund category’s 
proportional increase in net dollar fund flows. She also runs lagged regressions for up 
to one year and finds that as competition within a strategy increases, liquidation by 
funds in this strategy increases as well. She also finds that better performing strategies 
attract a higher asset flow in the next time period. This means that when a strategy is 
                                                 
3
 This is a view shared by industry commentators. For example, in a report on trends in the asset 
management industry, UBS (2005) states that fund managers’ skills will have to evolve if not they will 
lose their competitive advantage. See also Borrus (2005) and Watson Wyatt (2005). 
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performing well, more assets are being invested in the strategy, either through already 
established funds or by the creation of new funds. The increasing number of 
liquidations could be taken as an indication of a lower level of returns within the 
strategy, and that market opportunities therefore erode as the competition within a 
strategy increases. 
 
However, not everyone agrees there is a capacity effect. Géhin & Vaissié (2005) 
looking at a data sample for the period 1997 to 2004 argue that alpha or manager skill 
is being overestimated as a return factor, and that returns coming from exposure to 
beta, in the form of rewarded market risk as well as other systematic risk factors, are 
being neglected. They find that pure alpha only accounts for around 4 per cent of 
hedge fund returns, and that 96 per cent is accounted for by static and dynamic betas. 
Hence changes in the beta environment, as experienced in recent years with markets 
experiencing low levels of volatility, could be considered the cause of the decline in 
hedge fund performance, and not a fall-off in alpha, which would have been the result 
of eroding excess return opportunities. Their findings also mean that hedge fund 
returns will by cyclical, following the changes in beta environments. Furthermore, 
Géhin & Vaissié find no clear evidence of a downward trend in alphas and conclude 
that the hedge fund industry is limited more by the availability of superior managers 
than market capacity. 
 
Another area which has received interest by researchers is the case of the performance 
of small versus large funds. With this, as with the other areas of research, there have 
been differences in the evidence and conclusions. Amenc et al. (2003) find larger 
funds outperform smaller funds. In contrast, Ammann & Moerth (2005) show some 
evidence of a negative relationship between fund size and performance.4 However, 
they also conclude that very small funds underperform on average compared to larger 
funds which they attribute to a higher total expense ratio. Support for their views is 
provided by Edwards & Caglayan (2001) who find that performance increases at a 
declining rate as size of assets under management increases. Ineichen (2002) suggests 
that good performance followed by bad performance could be blamed on an increase 
in asset flows. Gregoriou & Rouah (2002) conclude that they cannot find any size-
                                                 
4
 Agerwal et al (2004, 2005) examines these issues within the context of managers’ incentives. 
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performance relationship. However, they state that an increase in size could decrease 
the fund’s speed in trading operations, and as a result have a negative effect in the 
long run. They conclude that further research is needed in this area.  
 
Liang (2003) argues that the wide range of asset classes held by hedge funds, their use 
of leverage, and different incentive management fees make the return calculation 
problematic. Building on the work by Fung & Hsieh (1997), Agarwal & Naik (2000) 
use an option-based performance measure. As a result they examine both linear and 
non-linear risk exposures. They find that by using option-based and buy-and-hold 
strategies as factors in their model, they are able to explain a significant higher 
proportion of the variation in hedge fund returns over time. Therefore, non-linear 
factors could prove to be important when assessing hedge fund performance (Gupta et 
al, 2003). Schneeweis (1999) argues that no conclusion can be reached as to how 
alpha should be measured. However, he points out that the risk-free rate is probably 
not the correct benchmark as any investment strategy involves some kind of risk. 
Alexander & Dimitriu (2005) use four different factor models to estimate the alpha 
for hedge funds, including both linear and non-linear factors. They conclude that there 
are large differences in alpha estimations by the different factor models, and that the 
ranking of alpha will be a better way of evaluating performance. In the same way 
Amenc et al. (2003) test a large range of models and conclude that differences in the 
way the models rank performance are one of the important findings of their study.  
 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
This paper uses net-of-fee returns, assets under management, together with details on 
funds and strategies, from the HFR and CISDM databases. 5 The HFR database 
consists of approximately 4300 dead and live hedge funds and 1200 funds of funds. 
These are divided into 20 strategies. Funds in the CISDM database normally report 
                                                 
5
 The HFR database, which will be used throughout this paper, was used by Liang (1999) Agarwal & 
Naik (1999, 2000), Agarwal (2001) and Loeys and Fransolet (2004) The CISDM database has also 
been used in several research papers, including those of Fung & Hsieh (1997), Amin & Kat (2001) and 
Clunie & Ashton (2005). This paper will make use of the CISDM database for comparison with HFR 
data only. Schneeweis & Spurgin (1997) and Capocci (2001) both used a combination of the HFR and 
the CISDM databases. 
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their asset under management figures in US dollars. For other currencies, to provide 
comparability, these are converted to US dollars using end of month foreign exchange 
rates. Several of the funds listed in the CISDM database have incomplete data. Funds 
that only report returns have been eliminated from the database as have funds not 
reporting assets under management or missing returns data for more than three 
months have also been eliminated, as have funds of funds. 
 
HFR and CISDM started collecting data in 1994 and 1990 respectively and as this 
study covers the period 1991 to 2004 to give the longest possible time series, it is 
susceptible to backfilling bias, due to funds providing past data when entering the 
database.6 The number of unique funds in the two databases is unknown but a 
correlation of the monthly returns of the HFR Fund Weighted Composite Index (HFR 
Index) and the CISDM Equally Weighted Hedge Fund Index (CISDM Index) for the 
period from January 1995 to December 2004 resulted in a correlation of .9939. 
Brooks & Kat (2001) find that indices which are supposed to cover the same type of 
strategy often have a high level of heterogeneity, which implies low correlation. The 
high correlation between the HFRI Index and the CISDM Index could imply that this 
is not the case for these two indices. However, the correlation between single 
strategies between the two databases is lower.7 
 
Three tests were undertaken to see if decreasing excess risk-adjusted returns are 
affected by asset flows and assets under management. There is little consensus in the 
literature on which method is best to determine abnormal risk-adjusted returns. 
Simple excess return models (which compute fund returns less the risk free interest 
rate), as well as linear and non-linear multi-factor models have been used (Amenc et 
al., 2003). In the first test, simple excess returns for the hedge fund strategies and 
groups of strategies are calculated and then used as the dependent variables in time-
                                                 
6
 Ackermann et al. (1999) study instant history bias. With regards to backfilling, the paper states that 
normal practice in empirical testing is to eliminate the first two years of reported data. However, the 
paper concludes that since hedge fund data is so limited, while desirable, this should not be done. 
In addition, instant history bias will always be present. The fact that both HFR and CISDM include 
dead and alive funds means the sample base has reduced survivorship bias. For the purposes of this 
paper and in order to give as long a time period as possible, the possibility of hindsight bias will have 
to be accepted. and this should be taken into consideration in the results. 
7
 The findings show that the correlation was between .60, for the fixed income arbitrage indices, and 
.95 for the equity long-short indices. Unfortunately, it is not clear the extent to which this reflects 
differences in classification or different populations in the databases.  
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series regressions. In the second test, Jensen’s Alpha is used as the dependent 
variable.  
 
The third test uses a multifactor alpha performance measure derived from a linear 
multifactor model. As several studies have shown, multifactor models tend to be 
better at explaining hedge fund returns. One reason for this could be the wide range 
and hence heterogeneity of hedge funds strategies and hence the number of different 
factors that could explain their returns. Agarwal & Naik (1999) set up a multifactor 
model to evaluate hedge fund performance, using eight asset class factors. Liang 
(1999) uses the same number of asset classes when trying to assess abnormal returns 
in the hedge fund industry, using the following model: 
 
ttk
k
kt FR εβα ++= ∑ ,     (1) 
 
where Fk,t is the kth factor value at time t. 
 
In regard to multifactor models, Schneeweis et al. (2003) argue that recent work 
undertaken to understand drivers of hedge fund return have made such models even 
more appropriate. However, the paper also concludes that, for many uses, single-
factor models may also be used. A single-factor model is what Brown et al. (1999) 
and Ackermann et al. (1999) use when analysing performance. In their paper, 
Ackermann et al. (1999) use the traditional Sharpe ratio to compare the hedge fund 
industry with the mutual fund industry. 
 
The fact that our models are linear should be commented upon. Non-linear models 
proposed by Agarwal & Naik (2000) among others, seem to explain a higher level of 
the returns obtained by hedge funds. However, there is still no general agreement 
among researchers on this. Meredith et al. (2005) use a larger number of factors than 
Agarwal & Naik. However, they choose not to include non-linear factors. Because of 
the high level of complexity in finding suitable factors, this paper does not use non-
linear factors in the performance models since the aim is to test the effect of changes 
in assets under management on performance rather than to explain the way excess 
returns are being generated (Capocci, 2001). 
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Getmansky (2005) states that fund flows into funds accrue at the end of each month. 
As a result one would expect parts of the asset flow effect on returns to be evident 
after the month the asset flow is reported. Therefore we also run regressions with 
lagged returns. Clunie & Ashton (2005) incorporate a one-year lag for returns in their 
model. They also check for correlation with lagged asset flows and find a lower 
correlation. This test actually checks if returns have any impact on asset flows, and 
not the other way around. Given this, we examine lagged returns up to two years only, 
and not lagged asset flows.  
 
To be able to run regressions with alphas and excess risk-adjusted returns as 
dependent variables, we need more than one figure for the time period in our tests. As 
our data from HFR goes back to 1991, we are able to run regressions with 14 data 
points. Clunie & Ashton (2005) use only asset growth as their independent variable in 
their regression. As a robustness test, we also run regressions of our performance 
measures against lagged assets under management. This should lead to a higher 
degree of significance in our results. 
 
Finally, the strategies we analyse are Distressed Securities, Merger Arbitrage, Event-
Driven Multi Strategy, Equity Market Neutral, Fixed Income Arbitrage, Convertible 
Arbitrage, Equity Long-Short, Global Macro and Emerging Markets (Table 1 
provides an explanation of these strategies). These nine strategies are representative of 
the directional, arbitrage, and event-driven groups of strategies with three strategies 
chosen from each group. The three groups of strategies will show if a particular group 
is more heavily affected by asset flows. The HFR Index will also be tested, as a proxy 
for the hedge fund universe, to check for industry-wide effects of the increase in asset 
flows.  
 
 
RESULTS 
 
 
We first review the three tests individually and then compare the results from the 
different tests. For the three tests in this paper, six different regressions were 
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undertaken. In the first test, simple excess returns, defined as return of strategy less 
risk-free rate, were calculated and regressed against asset flows and assets under 
management with and without lags. For each test, we show the correlation between 
the performance variable (excess returns, Jensen’s Alpha, or multivariate alpha) and 
contemporaneous and lagged fund flows. 
 
Our first test takes simple excess returns over the risk-free benchmark and fund flows 
and assets under management. The correlation between strategies and fund flows is 
given in Table 2. At the industry level there is no indication that flows have any 
relationship to fund returns as measured by the HFR index. However, this is not the 
case when viewing the individual strategies. The Event-Driven Multi Strategy, Equity 
Long-Short and Global Macro are correlated to flows. When lagged, Merger 
Arbitrage is also significant. In Table 3, we use a simple regression model of flows 
and assets under management lagged by one year, and find significant coefficients for 
Equity Long-Short for flows and Merger Arbitrage for flows as well as assets under 
management. Equity Market Neutral is also significant for lagged assets under 
management. If we relax the normal 95 per cent confidence limit to 90 per cent, we 
also get significant coefficients for the Event Driven Multi Strategy. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
This first test uses excess returns as an indicator of alpha performance. While this has 
been used in other studies, it suffers from the problem that it cannot distinguish true 
alpha performance. It is therefore preferable to use a clean measure of alpha, namely 
Jensen’s alpha measure, which we do in our second test. Table 4 shows the correlation 
of Jensen’s alpha with flows. When performance is measured with Jensen’s alpha, we 
find that Global Macro is the only strategy that has a significant coefficient. As with 
test one, we also compute regressions for Jensen’s alpha against flows and lagged 
assets and the results are shown in Table 5. The significant strategies are Merger 
Arbitrage, Global Macro, and Equity Market Neutral when analysed for lagged assets 
under management. If we relax the significance to 90 per cent, then Global Macro 
when flows are not lagged also becomes significant. 
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[Insert Table 4 about here] 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
 
One possibility for the poor results is that Jensen alphas are insignificant. However, 
this does not appear to be the case. We report the performance measure in Table 6 for 
each of the years of our study as well as the summary value for each of the strategies. 
With few exceptions, the values are positive and quite significant.8 Poor alpha 
performance does not seem to lie behind the lack of significance between asset flows 
and assets under management measures. Nor does a fall-off in alpha over time, as 
suggested by Géhin & Vaissié (2005), help explain the lack of significance in our 
results. The results from this test therefore indicate that hedge funds are not subject to 
capacity constraints, as commonly suggested. 
 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
 
In our third test we use multifactor alphas as our indicator of performance. Since these 
are akin to style alphas used in performance attribution, they can be considered 
refinements of Jensen’s approach that allow for hedge fund returns to have a 
multiplicity of return factors (Fama & French, 1996). As such, the multifactor alpha 
may correct for inaccuracies in the first two estimates of return used in our earlier 
tests and in particular the alpha estimates derived from a single market factor using 
Jensen’s methodology. Table 7 reports the correlation between the multifactor alpha 
for the different strategies and the asset flows. This shows that without any lag, the 
Event-Driven Multi Strategy and Equity Long-Short categories are significant at the 5 
                                                 
8
 As regards performance, 1998 stands out as the worst year for the majority of strategies, which 
accords with the findings in the Clunie & Ashton (2005) paper. They state that this period coincided 
with the Russian currency crises in 1998 which led to both a devaluation of the rouble and defaults on 
both private and public debt, and the near collapse of Long Term Management (LTCM). The poor 
hedge fund performance seen in 1998 would indicate that it was not only LTCM that experienced 
rough times because of the adverse market environment, which saw extreme credit spreads and general 
illiquidity in the financial markets at this time. This would support the Géhin & Vaissié (2005) 
argument that hedge fund returns will follow changes in beta environments. 
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per cent and 1 per cent levels respectively. Interestingly enough the Directional Group 
of strategies is also significant at the 5 per cent level, but with the wrong sign. It is 
also significant at the 1 per cent level with the right sign when lagged by one year. Of 
the strategies only the Equity Long-Short strategy is significant for one year lagged 
flows, but only at the 10 per cent level. 
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
When analysing the regression equations, as shown in Table 8, we find that for flows 
that are not lagged, the Event-Drive Multi Strategy and Equity Long-Short strategies 
are significant at the 5 per cent level. The Directional Group is also significant, but 
has the wrong sign. When flows are lagged, then only the Equity Long Short strategy 
is significant (at the 1 per cent level). When lagged assets under management are 
used, then Equity Long-Short and Convertible Arbitrage are both significant at the 5 
per cent level and Equity Market Neutral at the 1 per cent level. Merger Arbitrage is 
significant at the 10 per cent level. 
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
Finally, we compare the results from the three different tests. Table 9 shows the 
significant regressions for the nine strategies and the three strategy groups. There is 
no clear pattern across the different tests or strong evidence for a capacity effect. The 
strategies which have significant results across some of the three tests are Merger 
Arbitrage, Equity Long-Short, and Equity Market Neutral. However, the evidence is 
not particularly compelling even allowing for the noisy nature of our data and tests. 
Interestingly Jensen’s alpha measure provides the least support for the capacity effect. 
If we accept that multifactor alpha is a more appropriate performance measure given 
the nature of hedge fund strategies, then this test indicates that it is only the Event-
Driven Multi Strategy and Equity Long-Short strategies that suffer from capacity 
effects.  
 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
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Table 9 does not lead much credence to the idea that there may be a delayed effect. 
There are fewer significant results from our lagged tests. One possible explanation is 
possible misspecification. When using assets under management as an alternative 
measure of capacity, we find three significant strategies, one of which Equity Long-
Short is also significant when flows are used, whereas Convertible Arbitrage and 
Equity-Market Neutral are not significant when flows are used. A possible 
explanation is that there is a combination effect where some strategies experience an 
almost immediate impact from inflows while others, as suggested by Gregoriou & 
Rouah (2002) there is a lagged effect.  
 
Turning to those strategies which have significant results, if capacity constraints exist 
we would expect Merger Arbitrage to suffer from this problem. The strategy benefits 
from a clearly limited type of market anomaly that exists only before and after 
mergers and takeovers. Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) conclusively make the case that 
such capacity constraints should exist. This also applies to the Equity Market Neutral 
strategy which is a pure arbitrage strategy that seeks to benefit from differences in the 
prices of related securities. There are likely to be a limited number of these 
opportunities available. So both these strategies are likely to be negatively affected by 
increases in the funds devoted to these strategies. However, there does not seem to be 
such a strong rationale for the significant results for the Equity Long-Short strategy. 
This relies on stock selection and portfolio construction and hence should have no 
market constraint. That said, it is possible that institutional factors in markets 
(availability of stock to borrow, cost of borrowing, haircuts, and other frictions) limit 
the capacity of hedge funds to operate effectively.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
Hedge fund industry commentators suggest that there may be a limit to the size of the 
industry due to a capacity effect. This may be due to a lack of opportunities created by 
large amounts of money chasing elusive alpha opportunities or the result of a dilution 
of talent as more funds are set up or–or a combination of these effects. Our results do 
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not support the capacity constraint hypothesis, but equally do not categorically reject 
it outright either. Our findings are tantalising in that, for some strategies, we do see 
significant results but these are not particularly consistent across the different tests. 
Also, it is difficult to explain the presence of the Equity Long-Short group as a 
constrained strategy. There should be no capacity effect for directional strategies since 
there are few clear scale limitations. That said the directional group of strategies has 
experienced the highest inflow of capital during the last 15 years and hence dilution of 
manager capability could be an explanation. 
 
Our results are constrained by both data limitations and our performance statistics. A 
potential line of future research would involve more detailed funds flow data 
combined with refined performance measures. There is the fact that, as industry 
observers attest, the current size of the hedge industry is many times that which 
existed at the start of our data. It may be the fact therefore that the industry is only 
now seeing the emergence of limits to capacity. This might be diluting the results 
from our study and a focus on more recent performance data would provide stronger 
evidence one way or the other. 
 
Finally, when arguing for and against the existence of an effect of changes in assets 
under management on returns in the hedge fund industry, it is crucial to take into 
account the expansion in underlying opportunities. The performance of the industry, 
which is affected by a wide range of markets and factors, has depended on the 
exploration and exploitation of what Leibowitz (2005) calls “chronic inefficiencies”. 
Therefore it would be interesting to look at the scale of these inefficiencies compared 
to increases in the amount of assets invested in the relevant strategies in a similar 
approach to that of Loeys & Fransolet (2004). If the scope for opportunities is greater 
than the amount of money going after these opportunities, then it is unlikely these 
strategies will be subject to a capacity constraint. 
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Table 1: Categorisation of hedge fund strategies 
 
 
Event-Driven Strategies 
• Distressed Securities – Strategy trying to benefit from shares of companies which for any reason 
have found themselves in a distressed situation. Reasons involve reorganisations, bankruptcies 
or other restructurings. The fund may go long or short and investments could be of many types, 
including corporate debt, stocks and warrants. Leverage may also be used.  
• Event-Driven Multi Strategy – Strategy trying to benefit from mispricing arising before, during 
or after significant transactional events. These could involve mergers and acquisitions, share 
buybacks, recapitalisations and financial distress situations. Funds may use both short and long 
positions in stocks, debt securities and options. Leverage is also typical for this strategy. 
• Merger Arbitrage – A similar strategy to the Event-Driven Multi Strategy, however this one 
focuses merely on mispricing occurring around mergers or takeovers. 
 
Directional Strategies 
• Emerging Markets – Strategy trying to benefit from investments in emerging markets usually the 
less-developed countries, by investing in debt or equity. Usually, short selling is not possible in 
these markets which makes effective hedging difficult to obtain and volatility is also higher, 
which makes the strategy riskier than some other hedge fund strategies. 
• Global Macro – Strategy trying to benefit from global economic movements caused by for 
example shifts in government policies or shifts in global supply and demand for resources. 
Funds making use of this strategy may use any financial instruments, invest in any major market 
and are often highly leveraged.  
• Equity Long-Short – Strategy where the fund manager is trying to neutralise market risk. This 
strategy demands high stock picking skill and fund managers often make use of leverage. In 
spite of the name, the strategy at times could invest in other types of securities. 
 
Arbitrage Strategies 
• Convertible Arbitrage – Strategy trying to profit from buying convertible securities and shorting 
the common underlying stock. Doing this reduces the equity risk of the security. 
• Equity Market Neutral – Strategy trying to benefit from mispricing of related securities, by 
making use of both short and long positions. This could mean investing in only one type of 
industry to try to become sector neutral.  
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• Fixed Income Arbitrage – Strategy trying to benefit from market inefficiencies in the bond 
market, which implies taking up short and long positions. Both corporate and government bonds 
can be used.  
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Table 2: Correlation of flows with excess returns by strategy 
  Not lagged Lagged 1 year Lagged 2 years 
Distressed Securities   -0.265x    0.250x   0.279x 
Merger Arbitrage   0.028        -0.567***       -0.510*** 
Event-Driven Multi Strategy     -0.511**  -0.077  0.033 
    
Event-Driven Group    -0.520** -0.055  0.023 
    
Emerging Markets    0.247x  0.045 -0.020 
Equity Long-Short       -0.533***   -0.340*    -0.507** 
Global Macro        0.541*** -0.111 0.103 
    
Directional Group      0.645***   -0.392* -0.023 
    
Convertible Arbitrage   0.033 -0.107  -0.201 
Fixed Income Arbitrage   0.138   0.200x   -0.297x 
Equity Market Neutral   0.161 -0.054  -0.245x 
    
Arbitrage Group   -0.236x   -0.234x -0.148 
    
HFRI Index -0.013   -0.380*  0.075 
        
Symbols indicate x 25 per cent; * 10 per cent,** 5 per cent, and *** 1 per cent significance levels 
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Table 3: Test 1 results for excess returns and asset flows  
Panel A: Excess returns against asset flows (not lagged) 
 Distressed 
securities 
Merger 
arbitrage 
Event-
driven 
multi-
strategy 
Emerging 
markets 
Equity 
long-
short 
Global 
macro 
Convertible 
arbitrage 
Fixed 
income 
arbitrage 
Equity 
market 
neutral 
Event-
driven 
group 
Directional 
group 
Arbitrage 
group 
Intercept .0108 .0056 .0127 .0094 .0158 .0098 .0048 .0030 .0038 .0108 .0043 .0053 
T stat 3.9552*** 4.1003*** 5.2677*** 1.6054 4.8589*** 3.5836 3.5496*** 1.5278 4.3074*** 5.256*** 1.282 4.0496*** 
Beta -5.74E-13 7.87E-14 -5.3E-13 1.38E-12 -3.5E-13 2.27E-13 4.21E-14 3.84E-13 1.35E-13 -2.9E-13 3.97E-13 -1.52E-13 
T-stat -.9507 .0985 -2.0599* .8826 -2.1836** 2.2289 .1156 .4829 .5657 -2.1115* 2.9270** -.8421 
Adj R2 -.0008 -.0825 .1997 -.0173 .2247 .2339 -.0821 -.0627 -.0552 .2101 .3679 -.0229 
     **      **  
Symbols indicate: * 10 per cent,** 5 per cent, and *** 1 per cent significance levels 
 
 
Panel B: Excess returns against asset flows (lagged 1 year) 
 Distressed 
securities 
Merger 
arbitrage 
Event-
driven 
multi-
strategy 
Emerging 
markets 
Equity 
long-
short 
Global 
macro 
Convertible 
arbitrage 
Fixed 
income 
arbitrage 
Equity 
market 
neutral 
Event-
driven 
group 
Directional 
group 
Arbitrage 
group 
Intercept .0077 .0069 .0095 .0093 .01266 .0085 .0060 .0027 .0038 .0079. .0126 .0050 
T stat 2.88411*** 5.5989*** 3.3084*** 1.4912 3.6079*** 2.7339** 3.5723*** 1.3194 4.0953*** 3.5609*** 3.1771*** 3.7775*** 
Beta 5.27E-13 -1.6E-12 -7.81E-14 2.57E-13 -2.09E-13 -4.15E-14 -1.32E-13 5.75E-13 -4.29E-14 -2.89E-14 -2.28E-13 -1.46E-13 
T-stat .8554 -2.2829** -.2548 .1503 -1.1980 -.3716 -.3566 .6781 -.1806 -.1826 -1.4113 -.8000 
Adj R2 -.0229 ..2598 -.0845 -.0887 .0350 -.0774 -.0784 -.0471 -.0877 -.0876 .0763 -.0309 
  **           
Symbols indicate: * 10 per cent,** 5 per cent, and *** 1 per cent significance levels 
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Panel C: Excess returns against assets under management (lagged 1 year) 
 Distressed 
securities 
Merger 
arbitrage 
Event-
driven 
multi-
strategy 
Emerging 
markets 
Equity 
long-
short 
Global 
macro 
Convertible 
arbitrage 
Fixed 
income 
arbitrage 
Equity 
market 
neutral 
Event-
driven 
group 
Directional 
group 
Arbitrage 
group 
Intercept .00769 .0078 .0101 .0273 .0145 .0293 .0066 .0051 .0057 .0088 .0230 .0053 
T stat 2.2787** 6.5359*** 3.6315*** 2.3197** 4.5307*** 4.6334 4.5326*** 2.0177* 5.5717*** 3.9037*** 3.4940*** 4.5407*** 
Beta 2.02E-13 -4.9E-13 -2.48E-14 -1.12E-12 -5.38E-14 -1.8E-13 -7.98E-14 -2.93E-13 -2.0E-13 -1.36E-14 -6.7E-14 -3.81E-14 
T-stat .8554 -2.8536** -.3438 -1.5725 -1.7784 -3.3030 -.8897 -.8442 -2.3147** -.3548 -2.1213* -1.1028 
Adj R2 -.0127 ..3546 -.0728 .1018 .1426 .4326 -.0163 -.0226 .2511 -.0721 .2121 .0164 
  **       **    
Symbols indicate: * 10 per cent,** 5 per cent, and *** 1 per cent significance levels 
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Table 4: Correlation between Jensen's Alphas and flows by strategy 
  Not Lagged Lagged 1 Year Lagged 2 Years 
    
Distressed Securities -0.052   0.308x  0.185 
Merger Arbitrage  0.134  -0.240x  -0.320x 
Event-Driven Multi Strategy -0.099  0.112  0.011 
 
   
Event-Driven Group -0.156  0.139  -0.001 
 
   
Emerging Markets  0.051 -0.068  -0.186 
Equity Long-Short  -0.314x   0.037  -0.270x 
Global Macro      0.475**   -0.183x  0.108 
 
   
Directional Group     0.512**  -0.290x  -0.229x 
 
   
Convertible Arbitrage   0.303x  0.099  -0.051 
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0.159    0.239x   -0.327x 
Equity Market Neutral 0.108  -0.043  -0.169 
 
   
Arbitrage Group -0.117  -0.125  -0.115 
 
   
HFRI Index -0.027  0.122   -0.331x 
        
Symbols indicate x 25 per cent, * 10 per cent, and ** 5 per cent significance levels 
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Table 5: Test 2, results for Jensen’s Alpha against asset flows and assets under management 
Panel A: Jensen’s alpha against asset flows (not lagged) 
 Distressed 
securities 
Merger 
arbitrage 
Event-
driven 
multi-
strategy 
Emerging 
markets 
Equity 
long-
short 
Global 
macro 
Convertible 
arbitrage 
Fixed 
income 
arbitrage 
Equity 
market 
neutral 
Event-
driven 
group 
Directional 
group 
Arbitrage 
group 
Intercept .0076 .0048 .0082 .0061 .0096 .0077 .0040 .0029 .0031 .00774 .0032 .0044 
T stat 2.5896** 3.6980*** 3.3246*** .8805 3.7492*** 2.8561** 2.6245** 1.3067 3.2734*** 3.4717*** .9570 2.9014** 
Beta -1.16E-13 3.5565 -9.0E-14 3.3E-13 -1.5E-13 1.88E-13 3.76E-13 4.98E-13 9.69E-14 -8.24E-14 2.79E-14 -8.6E-14 
T-stat -.1805 .4671 -.3444 .1756 -1.1459 1.8709* .2926 .5582 .3776 -.5483 2.0665* -.4086 
Adj R2 -.0804 -.0840 -.0727 -.0806 .0235 .1613 .0160 -.0559 -.0706 -.05686 .2010 -.0585 
             
Symbols indicate: * 10 per cent,** 5 per cent, and *** 1 per cent significance levels 
 
Panel B: Jensen’s alpha against asset flows (lagged 1 year) 
 Distressed 
securities 
Merger 
arbitrage 
Event-
driven 
multi-
strategy 
Emerging 
markets 
Equity 
long-
short 
Global 
macro 
Convertible 
arbitrage 
Fixed 
income 
arbitrage 
Equity 
market 
neutral 
Event-
driven 
group 
Directional 
group 
Arbitrage 
group 
Intercept .0052 .0854 .0087 .0056 .0063 .0067 .0045 .00260 .0028 ..0056 .0039 .0042 
T stat 1.9002* 3.9284*** 2.6500** .7746 2.6938** 2.2228** 2.7077** 1.1351 3.1719*** 2.6058** 2.3670** 2.6940** 
Beta 6.84E-13 -6.41E-13 1.0E-13 -4.5E-13 1.42E-14 -6.66E-14 1.2E-13 7.78E-13 -3.25E-14 7.09E-14 -1.5E-13 -8.9E-14 
T-stat 1.0748 -.6218 -3741 -.2250 .1222 -.6183 .3299 .8177 -.1412 .4655 -1.0048 -.4193 
Adj R2 .0128 -.0278 -.0772 -.0859 -.0894 -.0543 -.0802 -.0284 -.08893 -.0598 .0008 -.0738 
             
Symbols indicate: * 10 per cent,** 5 per cent, and *** 1 per cent significance levels 
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Panel C: Jensen’s alpha against assets under management (lagged 1 year) 
 Distressed 
securities 
Merger 
arbitrage 
Event-
driven 
multi-
strategy 
Emerging 
markets 
Equity 
long-
short 
Global 
macro 
Convertible 
arbitrage 
Fixed 
income 
arbitrage 
Equity 
market 
neutral 
Event-
driven 
group 
Directional 
group 
Arbitrage 
group 
Intercept .0060 .0068 .0079 .0241 .0093 .0273 .0054 .0056 .0049 .0069 .0158 .0048 
T stat 1.9256 5.3329*** 3.2238*** 1.7293 3.8991*** 4.8503*** 3.6414*** 1.9916* 4.4033*** 3.1920*** 2.5161** 3.4826*** 
Beta 1.60E-13 -3.8E-13 -1.1E-14 -1.19E-12 2.6E-14 -1.85E-13 -3.3E-14 -3.8E-13 -2.0E-13 -5.9E-15 -4.4E-14 -3.5E-14 
T-stat .6798 -2.1020** -.1742 -1.4130 -1.1612 -3.7269*** -.3585 -.9861 -2.1010** -.1610 -1.4714 -.8771 
R2 -.0432 .2082 -.0808 .0712 .0261 .4979 -.0719 -.0021 .2080 -.0810 .0826 -.0181 
  **    ***   **    
Symbols indicate: * 10 per cent,** 5 per cent, and *** 1 per cent significance levels 
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Table 6: Yearly Jensen's Alpha by strategy and 14-year average performance 
Per cent per year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
 
        
Distressed Securities 1.80 1.14 2.09 0.11 0.02 1.17 0.47 -1.49 
Merger Arbitrage 0.85 0.29 1.32 0.47 0.72 0.82 0.63 -0.23 
Event-Driven Multi Strategy 1.27 0.87 1.62 0.33 1.19 1.30 0.52 -1.00 
 
        
Event-Driven Group 1.31 0.76 1.67 0.30 0.64 1.10 0.54 -0.91 
 
        
Emerging Markets 2.15 1.00 4.47 0.50 -2.57 1.52 -0.45 -5.32 
Equity Long-Short 2.11 1.03 1.51 0.01 0.35 0.73 0.55 0.17 
Global Macro 2.31 1.55 2.92 -0.45 2.16 0.21 0.30 -0.37 
 
        
Directional Group 2.19 1.20 2.97 0.02 -0.02 0.82 0.13 -1.75 
 
        
Convertible Arbitrage 0.84 0.88 0.90 -0.47 0.61 0.56 0.40 -0.23 
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0.44 1.15 1.12 0.65 0.93 0.66 0.12 -1.64 
Equity Market Neutral 0.92 0.41 0.37 -0.14 0.53 0.77 0.50 0.11 
 
        
Arbitrage Group 0.73 0.81 0.80 0.01 0.69 0.66 0.34 -0.59 
 
        
HFR Index 0.23 1.95 1.34 1.94 -0.66 1.52 1.71 1.05 
         
         
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Average 
1991- 2004 
 
       
 
Distressed Securities 0.66 -0.09 0.92 0.74 1.75 0.96 0.73 
Merger Arbitrage 0.65 0.97 0.18 0.10 0.36 0.04 0.51 
Event-Driven Multi Strategy 1.06 0.17 1.04 0.36 1.39 0.59 0.76 
 
       
Event-Driven Group 0.79 0.35 0.71 0.40 1.16 0.53 0.67 
 
       
Emerging Markets 2.89 -0.86 1.41 1.20 2.20 0.93 0.65 
Equity Long-Short 1.98 0.51 0.23 0.22 1.06 0.09 0.75 
Global Macro 0.50 -0.52 0.28 0.55 1.42 0.07 0.78 
 
       
Directional Group 1.13 0.52 0.70 0.80 1.42 0.45 0.76 
 
       
Convertible Arbitrage 0.58 0.80 0.72 0.83 0.77 -0.08 0.51 
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0.11 -0.21 0.25 0.43 0.62 0.31 0.35 
Equity Market Neutral 0.17 0.70 0.08 -0.07 0.04 0.13 0.32 
 
       
Arbitrage Group 0.29 0.43 0.35 0.40 0.48 0.12 0.39 
 
       
HFR Index 0.19 1.69 0.53 0.45 0.11 1.51 0.97 
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Table 7: Correlation between multi-factor alpha and asset flows by strategy. 
 
  Not Lagged 
Lagged 1 
Year 
Lagged 2 
Years 
Distressed Securities   0.002  0.182  0.097 
Merger Arbitrage   0.233x  -0.215x  -0.365* 
Event-Driven Multi Strategy    -0.513**  -0.197x  -0.298x 
 
   
Event-Driven Group   -0.359*  -0.031 -0.140 
 
   
Emerging Markets -0.130  -0.010 -0.216x 
Equity Long-Short       -0.572***    -0.395*     -0.654*** 
Global Macro   0.258x  -0.151   0.377* 
 
   
Directional Group     0.511**       -0.548*** 0.065 
 
   
Convertible Arbitrage -0.147     -0.421**    -0.528** 
Fixed Income Arbitrage  -0.280x  0.151    -0.463** 
Equity Market Neutral   0.199x -0.014    -0.094** 
 
   
Arbitrage Group  -0.204x -0.215 -0.125 
 
   
HFRI Index   0.388*   -0.362* -0.010 
        
Symbols indicate x 25 per cent, * 10 per cent, ** 5 per cent, and *** 1 per cent significance levels 
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Table 8: Test 3 results for multiple alpha against asset flows and assets under management 
Panel A: Multiple alpha against asset flows (not lagged) 
 Distressed 
securities 
Merger 
arbitrage 
Event-
driven 
multi-
strategy 
Emerging 
markets 
Equity 
long-
short 
Global 
macro 
Convertible 
arbitrage 
Fixed 
income 
arbitrage 
Equity 
market 
neutral 
Event-
driven 
group 
Directional 
group 
Arbitrage 
group 
Intercept .7199 -.2197 1.2218 .6095 1.2761 .5046 .8877 .9171 .5653 .5703 -.0665 .4909 
T stat 5.1460*** -.2647 7.5759*** 1.0972 5.2945*** 2.0233* 4.9367*** 4.7620*** 4.0951*** 4.7615*** -.1566 4.1666*** 
Beta 2.49E-13 7.61E-10 -3.6E-11 -6.77E-11 -2.9E-11 8.61E-12 -2.07E-11 -7.5E-11 2.62E-11 -1.12E-11 3.5E-11 -1.18E-11 
T-stat .0081 1.5736 -2.0691** -.4545 -2.4186** .9258 -.5139 -1.0119 .7036 -1.3342 2.0587** -.7209 
Adj R2 -.0833 .1020 .2015 -.0650 .2717 -.0111 -.0600 .0018 -.0404 .05661 .1994 -.0384 
   **  **      **  
Symbols indicate: * 10 per cent,** 5 per cent, and *** 1 per cent significance levels 
 
Panel B: Multiple alpha against asset flows (lagged 1 year) 
 Distressed 
securities 
Merger 
arbitrage 
Event-
driven 
multi-
strategy 
Emerging 
markets 
Equity 
long-short 
Global 
macro 
Convertible 
arbitrage 
Fixed 
income 
arbitrage 
Equity 
market 
neutral 
Event-
driven 
group 
Directional 
group 
Arbitrage 
group 
Intercept .6641 .6630 1.0489 .5370 1.2504 .5462 .9331 .6904 .5811 ..4582 .8410 .4627 
T stat 4.6623*** 3.9942*** 5.5949*** .9007 5.7829*** 1.9953* 5.7350*** 3.8642*** 3.8304*** 3.4700*** 2.1190* 3.9760*** 
Beta 2.02E-11 -6.81E-11 -1.34E-11 -5.61E-12 -5.6E-12 -4.98E-12 -5.5E-11 3.76E-11 -1.81E-12 -9.7E-13 -3.5E-11 -1.18E-11 
T-stat .6146 -.7285 -.6675 -.0342 -2.7362*** -.5055 -1.5385 .5059 -.0460 -.1035 -2.1724* -.7309 
Adj R2 -.0547 -.0407 -.0484 -.0908 .3329 -.0662 .1026 -.0661 -.0907 -.0899 .2366 -.0404 
     ***        
Symbols indicate: * 10 per cent,** 5 per cent, and *** 1 per cent significance levels 
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Panel C: Multiple alpha against assets under management (lagged 1 year) 
 Distressed 
securities 
Merger 
arbitrage 
Event-
driven 
multi-
strategy 
Emerging 
markets 
Equity 
long-short 
Global 
macro 
Convertible 
arbitrage 
Fixed 
income 
arbitrage 
Equity 
market 
neutral 
Event-
driven 
group 
Directional 
group 
Arbitrage 
group 
Intercept .6670 .8716 1.1572 1.4867 1.0729 1.3091 1.0097 1.1346 .8390 .5033 1.5187 .5127 
T stat 4.4230*** 5.450*** 6.6340*** 1.2731 5.1963*** 2.0137* 7.2741*** 4.8589*** 5.1200*** 3.9537*** 1.9109* 4.8865*** 
Beta 6.71E-12 -4.9E-11 -6.08E-12 -6.38E-11 -1.4E-12 -7.61E-12 -2.0E-11 -5.75E-11 -2.9E-11 -9.3E-13 -5.53E-12 -3.67E-12 
T-stat .5949 -2.1432* -1.3480 -.9057 -2.0602** -1.3240 -2.3661** -1.7983* -2.0830*** .-4284 -1.4608 -1.1888 
R2 -.0523 .2166 .0591 -.0140 .1997 .0548 .2613 .1466 .2044 -.0670 .0802 .0308 
     **  **  ***    
Symbols indicate: * 10 per cent,** 5 per cent, and *** 1 per cent significance levels 
 
Is there evidence for a capacity constraint in hedge fund strategies? 
 
 30 
 
Table 9: Summary of test results 
 
 Excess returns Jensen’s alpha Multifactor alpha 
Strategy 
Flows 
no lag 
Lagged 
flows 
Lagged 
assets 
Flows 
no lag 
Lagged 
flows 
Lagged 
assets 
Flows 
no lag 
Lagged 
flows 
Lagged 
assets 
 
         
Distressed Securities          
Merger Arbitrage  ** **   **    
Event-Driven Multi Strategy       **   
 
         
Event-Driven Group          
 
         
Emerging Markets          
Equity Long-Short **      ** *** ** 
Global Macro      **    
 
         
Directional Group1 **      **   
 
         
Convertible Arbitrage         ** 
Fixed Income Arbitrage          
Equity Market Neutral   **   **   *** 
 
         
Arbitrage Group          
 
         
1
 – The directional group is significant at the 5 per cent level, but has the wrong sign. All other significant variables reported in the table have the correct sign. 
 
